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A 1910 United States Congress repo11 examining the conditions of women and 
children in labor across the country, concluded, "The history of women 's work in this 
country shows that legislation has been the only force which has improved the working 
conditions of any large number of women wage-earners." 1 Nationally, the U.S. 
government recognized that states needed to legislate in favor of women employees to 
correct their poor conditions. Women were of primary interest to reformers for their lack 
of agency and control of their working conditions. Women were "plentiful in supply, 
limited in occupational choice, concentrated at the bottom rungs of the industrial ladder, 
and often intermittently employed [they] lacked bargaining power,'' which left them 
plagued by insufficient wages, long hours, and bad working conditions.2 By initially 
advocating legislation on the behalf of women, reformers hoped to improve the lives of 
all workers. They believed that using legislation for women as precedent, legislation for 
all workers could be more easily won. 
The issue of protective legislation had existed for a number of years, but it was 
not until the Muller Supreme Court decision in 1908 that such laws were declared 
constitutional. Starting with Oregon and New York, states enacted legislation that would 
place a maximum hour limit, either by day or by week, for their working women. Laws 
limiting maximum hours were basic concepts of the Progressive plan to protect workers.3 
States began with labor commissions that examined the conditions of working women, 
and legislatures used this information to pass protective legislation that had been proven 
1 U.S. Senate, 6 1" Congress, 211 <1 Session. Report on Condition of Woman and Child Wage- Earners in the 
United States (S . Rpt 645), (Washington: Government Print ing Office, 1910), 12 . 
2 Nancy Woloch , Muller v. Oregon: A Brielf-lislo1 y with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 1996), 
5. 
3 Melvin Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation during the Progress ive Era: A Reeva luation," 
The Journal ofAmerican /-list01y 72, no. l (June 1985): 64. 
to stand up to a test of constitutionality. Distinguished commissions were created in New 
York (I 911) and Wisconsin ( 1911 ), as well as through the Department of Labor study of 
the conditions of working women across the nation, generally resulting in some variation 
of limitation to the hours that could be worked by employees. 
In 19 I 3, Indiana followed the trend and began the work to legislate for a 
maximum hour law for its women workers. Although the initial bills failed, the 
Assembly created a commission to travel the state and gain data about working women's 
conditions with the hope that a recommendation would prompt legislative action. 
However, by 1918, Indiana was one of just six states that did not limit the hours of its 
women laborers.4 For Indiana, a state with a strong progressive history, this was 
completely out of character. However, it was not for a lack of trying, as Indiana 
legislators had attempted to bring protective legislation before the General Assembly in 
1913, 1915, and 1919. To an observer, it appeared that the Commission on Working 
Women created by Indiana's Governor Ralston in 1913 would place Indiana on the path 
to protective legislation like so many other states at the time. Surprisingly, Indiana ' s 
commission did not perceive the public interest or the general welfare to be at stake, a 
standard that many states used to rationalize the need for such legislation.5 In light of 
Indiana's success with the public utilities commission, this is indeed a moment of curious 
failure. My project, "Protecting the Fairer Sex: Indiana' s Failure to Improve the Lives of 
Working Women," addresses the circumst;mces in Indiana that led to this unexpected 
defoat when similar laws were being enacted across the nation. 
4 
"Safeguard Urged for Children and Women in Plants," Indianapolis Star, 24 December 1918, 7. 
5 Ulla Wikander and Alice Kessler-Harris, Protecting Wom en: Labor Legislation in Europe. the United 
States. and Australia, 1880-1920 (Champaign: University of l llinois Press, 1995), 340. 
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In an era where protective labor legislation for women was the norm, Indiana 
stands out as an anomaly in its negligence to intervene. My research is an examination of 
the negligence of Indiana to protect their white working women as well as the underlying 
reasons for such failure. The success of maximum hour laws for women has been widely 
documented but there has been little scholarship aimed at understanding the breakdown 
of legislative action.6 Historians have generally not considered the causes and effects of 
failure in history, but instead choose to focus on the success. 
"Protecting the Fairer Sex" explores the refusal of Indiana lawmakers to place the 
well-being of their working women above "a can of corn," an accusation that was made 
by one state representative early in the legislative discussions. 7 It investigates how the 
legislators knew nothing would come of protective legislation in the state, regardless of 
their fake expressions of concern. My work tells the story of how Indiana women were 
pushed to the periphery of a state that prided itself on its seemingly progressive nature. 
Utilizing primary sources from local newspaper articles and the 1913 Indiana House 
journals, my work addresses the legislative shortcomings that resulted in the creation of 
the commission. Archival records, such as hearing transcripts, were instrumental in 
informing my understanding of the successes and setbacks of the commission. My 
research was conducted from records located at the Indians State Library, Indiana 
Historical Society, and the Indiana State Archives. Additionally, I utilized the 
Indianapolis Central Library for newspaper microfilm. Together, these local archives, as 
6 For scholarship on the success of protective legislation, see Susan Lehrer, Origins of Protective 
Legislation for Women, 1905-1925 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987). Alice 
Kessler-Harri s, Out to Work: A Histo1J' of Wage-Earning Women in the United States (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1983). Melvin Urofsky, "State Courts and Protective Legislation during the 
Progress ive Era: A Reevaluation," The Journal a/American Hist01 y 72, no. I (June 1985): 63 -91. Teresa 
Amott and Julie Matthaei , Race, Gender and Work: A Multi-Cultural Economic Histo1J1 o/ Wom en in the 
United States (Cambridge: South End Press, 1999). 
7 
"Keegan, Beaten in 8-1-lour Day Fight, Resigns," Indianapolis Star, 14 February 191 3, I. 
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well as numerous secondary sources have aided me in gaining a better understanding of 
the commission, both its members and their work, as well as, the public reaction to their 
efforts. Historians writing about Indiana have paid little attention to the Commission, 
treating it as a footnote in history. This analysis is the first of its kind to study the event 
from the beginning of the 1913 House hearing to the final recommendations of the 
Commission in early 1915. 
A plethora of work has been written about Indiana during the Progressive Era, and 
many have labeled the state as progressive, going so far as to write entire dissertations 
about Indiana's legacy. However, only certain aspects of Indiana' s progressive history 
are celebrated, specifically housing reform, workmen's compensation laws, an 
inheritance tax, and the public utilities commission.8 ln regards to labor legislation, 
Indiana was not regarded as progressive. In a majority of these works, the fight for 
women's protective legislation is glossed over. Suellen Hoy's PhD. thesis, "Samuel 
Ralston: Progressive Governor, 1913-1917" (1975) makes broad claims about the 
progressive character of Governor Ralston that, in relation to the commission on working 
women, are inconsistent. Hoy argues that during the public utilities commission, Ralston 
"had not hesitated to give wholehearted support to a measure that was to redress the 
balance in favor of the weak nor had he faltered in the face of opposition."9 However, 
utilizing the same analysis proves inaccurate in light of the commission on working 
women. Furthermore, Hoy ' s analysis all but ignores the failure to enact protective 
8 Suellen Hoy, "Samuel Ral ston: Progress ive Governor, 191 3-1917" (Ph.D. , Indiana University, 1975), 
238 . 
9 !bid., 84. 
4 
legislation. Similarly, extensive histories on the State have largely failed to mention the 
commission for working women. 10 
Inspired by Sharon Wood 's Freedom of the Streets (2005), a work focused on the 
mid-sized town of Davenport, Iowa, my analysis also looks at a handful of similarly sized 
Indiana cities and their reaction to impeding government interference in the lives of their 
women workers. The use of middling industrial cities, both in my research and in 
Wood 's, highlight the importance of the experiences of their citize~1s. 11 These cities were 
important for their strong industrial ties, an experience that was the norm for most 
Americans at the time. The experiences of citizens in Indianapolis, New Albany, and 
Lafayette were the norm more so than those who lived in Chicago or New York. Similar 
to my goal , Wood's work is focused on a deeper understanding of one aspect, namely 
women's acceptance in public spaces, of industrialized cities, whi le my research is 
focused on the conditions of women laborers. 
My study also draws from Barbara Springer's dissertation, "Ladylike Reformers: 
Indiana Women and Progressive Reform , 1900-1920" ( 1985). Whi le she analyzes the 
work of Indiana clubwomen, Springer also addresses a variety of progressive era 
legislation, including the fight for women's protective legislation. The 191 3 fight for the 
reform of working hours highlighted the class divide of working and privileged women. 
Although Indiana clubwomen were incredibly influential in numerous progressive 
reforms, they played a n1uch smaller ro le in advocating on behalf of working women. 
1° For scholarship on other hi stori es of Indiana, see: James Mad ison, The Indiana Way, Bloomington, IN : 
Indiana Univers ity Press, 1986. Phillips, Cli fton. Indiana in Transition: The Emergence o/an Industrial 
Commonwealth, 1880- 1920. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1968 . 
11 For this paper, I define mid-sized city as cities with populations between 20,000 to 70,000, which all of 
the cities analyzed fall into except for Indianapolis. The 1910 populations of the 10 cities selected fe ll 
between 20,081 in Lafayette and 69,647 in Evansvi lle. Indianapo lis is considerably larger at 233 ,650. 
" Indiana City/Town Census Counts, 1900 to 20 1 O," STATS Indiana, accessed 17 March 20 14, 
https://www.stats. indiana.edu/population/PopTota ls/historic _counts_ cities.asp 
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Using her work has given me a greater understanding of Indiana's progressive nature 
while drawing a stark contrast between clubwomen's fight for housing reforms as 
opposed to the fight for protective legislation. Because clubwomen had been incredibly 
successful in influencing progressive reforms, they chose to spend less energy on 
working women as a cause for reform. Springer frames Indiana clubwomen as "ladylike 
reformers," highlighting their struggle and insistence to maintain traditional gender roles 
as wives and mothers in the political sphere. Working class women's decision to take 
jobs outside the home weakened traditional gender roles, showing that women could be 
contributors in the home. By extension, working women threatened all women's 
existence as solely wives and mothers, explaining why protective legislation was not a 
top priority for working women. My understanding of clubwomen's lack of enthusiasm 
for the protective legislation movement is influenced by Springer. Although I disagree 
with her analysis of clubwomen as lacking political agency, her work is nonetheless 
important in grasping why protective legislation failed in light of Indiana's progressive 
nature. 
Prior to 1890, Indiana was a largely rural and agricultural state with a mostly 
native white population. It grew from 169, 164 in 1900 to 233 ,650 in 1910, making 
Indianapolis the twenty second largest city by 1910 and the ninth largest Midwestern 
city. 12 In many ways, the industrial era of the I 890 ' s caught Indiana off guard, as it 
"catapult[ ed] the state into an unprecedented epoch of both agricultural and industrial 
12 
"Indiana City/Town Census Counts" 
In order of size, the following cities had larger populations than Indianapolis, according to the 1910 census: 
Chicago, St. Louis, Cleveland, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, Minneapolis, and Kansas C ity. 
"Population of the I 00 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990," U. S. 
Census Bureau, accessed 17 March 2014, 
http://www.census.gov/popu lation/www /documentation/twps002 7 /twps0027.htm1 
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prosperity." 13 For many medium sized cities, one of the greatest concerns with this 
sudden assent to industrialization was the dislocation of finnly established morals in 
Indiana society. Indianapolis was viewed as "a somewhat blurry but nevertheless 
authentic mirror of Hoosierdom at large." 14 In relation to other mid-size industrial cities, 
Indianapolis retained a great deal of its rural charm, but it would be incorrect to say that it 
did not experience some of the ills of industrialization. Indiana's location and abundance 
of natural resources placed it at an advantage for the types of industries that were 
developing at this time. Its natural resources of coal , oil, and natural gas were ideal for 
the manufacturing of steel and ready-made products such as cotton clothing, canning, and 
laundries. Additionally, manufacturing industries were suited for women because they 
repeated the same task for hours at a time and did not require a great deal of skill. 15 
Thus, women could be employed rather cheaply, prompting many employers choice to 
hire women rather than men for simpler tasks. 16 
Indianapolis, once a semi-rural town, became a blossoming and vibrant city. At 
the center of the state, "it became the transportation and commercial hub of Indiana. Its 
favorable situation drew new industries to it so that in the l 890 ' s its manufacturing 
potential expanded twice as fast as the rest of urban America." 17 Likewise, an 
Indianapolis Star ai1icle from 1912 boasted that the city was "a good place in which to 
live because we have here, generally speaking, a decent, law-abiding citizenship. The 
love of home and a desire for the better things in life predominate. Our people are 
13 Richard Del Vecchio, "Indiana Politics during the Progress ive Era, 1912-1916" (PhD. di ss, University of 
Notre Dame, 1973), IV. 
14 Irvin S. Cobb, Indiana (New York, 1924), 34, as quoted in James Madison, The Indiana Way , 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 6. 
15 Susan Lehrer, Origins of Protective labor l egislation for Wom en, 1905-1925 (Albany, NY: University 
of New York Press, 1987), 19. 
16 Ibid., 26. 
17 Del Vicchio, "Ind iana Politics," 11. 
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energetic and progressive and are possessed of a wonderful amount of civic pride." 18 
However, by 1910, Indianapolis had passed its zenith and was in a slow, steady decline. 
Municipal govermnents noted lndianapolis, "once the pride of the state, became after 
1910 scandalously tainted by continual graft and inefficiency. The only 'redeeming' 
element in Indianapolis's political malaise was that it was not as bad as that of Terre 
H d G ,, 19 aute an ary. 
As industrialization swept across the nation, creating large urban areas all over a 
country that had been primarily rural , American citizens struggled to cope with these new 
social issues, such as poverty, prostitution, disease, drunke1mess, and unsafe tenements. 
Nationwide, people turned to their governments- local, state, and federal- as an answer 
to these societal ills, through a regulation of economic problems, relieving social issues, 
and reconciling change with tradition. Progressivism "reflected a growing, if temporary, 
consensus among Americans that major changes in the late nineteenth century had 
produced unwelcome, un-American imbalances in their society."20 Reform became the 
rallying cry of politicians in both parties during this time, and the "consistent conviction 
of virtually all Progressives was that a ' public interest' or 'common good' really 
existed. "2 1 However, "until 1912, no one party, nor a faction of a party, endeavored to 
identify itself as the reform wing," when the Progressive party split from the Republican 
Party.22 Although the Republican Party was the majority party in the General Assembly 
for more than twenty years, the Republican and Progressive split proved too great to 
maintain majority after the 1912 elections. 
18 
"Why Indianapolis is a Good Place to Live," Indianapolis Star, 24 December 191 2, 8. 
19 Del Vicchio, "Indiana Politi cs," 16. 
20 Walter Nugent, Progressivism: A Ve1y Short Introduction (Ox ford : Ox ford University Press, 20 I 0), 2. 
2 1 Ibid ., 3 . 
22 Del Yicchio, " Indiana Politics," 43. 
8 
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Generally, Indiana political parties were evenly matched, "mean[ing] that the 
parties had to engage in an exhaustingly endless effort to hold their own ranks and gather 
in simultaneously a few thousand more votes from the opposition."23 The high stakes 
political game in Indiana made it difficult for legislators to disregard public opinion when 
creating and implementing law, as it could lead to a loss in seats for the following 
election. The Democrats also faced an ideological divide over progressive issues but 
were led by popular leaders such as governor elect Samuel Ralston who were able to 
minimize conflict by advocating cautious reform. 24 The Indiana Democratic constituency 
"was comprised of those groups who were figuratively and geographically on the 
periphery of Indiana society."25 To garner a larger portion of the electorate in 1912, 
Samuel Ralston maintained a rather bland platform, knowing the Progressive and 
Republican split was sure to guarantee a Democratic victory. The Democratic strategy 
was to "defend their past records, offer a few popularly 'safe reforms,' and avoid the 
moral battles and personality feuds ."26 In the months leading to the election, a poll 
showed that on the whole, Indiana residents preferred progressivism, so Ralston updated 
his platform "by pledging himself to ... labor legislation," among other things. 27 
Additionally, the Party focused more on the small industrial laborer as opposed to the 
employer. In his first address, he asserted, "the boy with his pick on his shoulder has as 
strong a claim upon society as the boy with his interest-bearing bonds in his pocket. The 
man with the tin bucket must not be lost sight of in the rush to bestow favors on the man 
23 Ibid., 32. 
24 Madison, The Indiana Way, 221. 
25 Del Vicchio, "Indiana Politics," 146. 
26 Ibid. , 166. 
27 Ibid., 167. 
9 
with the iron box."28 By acknowledging the common laborer, Ral ston made a connection 
with nearly 10% of the population, according to the 1910 census.29 
In the end, the Democrats strategy paid off and the Republican and Progressive 
split was so deep that in 1913 the Democratic Party had control of 40 of 50 Senate seats 
and 95 of 100 House seats in the state legislature.Jo Now, the Democrats had to capitalize 
on their promises to enact labor reform. With such a large Democratic majority, it was 
more difficult to control and keep the legislators faithful to the party platform. After 
gaining office, a legislator had less need for the resources that the party could provide, 
and instead looked to his local constituency and area for direction in voting. While the 
Democratic Party was run by political boss Thomas Taggart, it was clear throughout the 
Sixty-Eighth Assembly that its failures were largely due to the machine failing to 
dominate rather than the machine dominating.JI Holding the party together was one of 
the reasons that the Assembly failed to deliver on their promises to labor in the 1913 
session. Believing that Democrats would always be in control, " the average legislature 
felt little need to endure the restrictions of party discipline or heed the commands of his 
leaders. ,,J2 This caused a variety of factions to form based on the issues, and led 
individual legislatures to "pursue some personal ambition, a local need, or a particular 
party commitment."JJ 
Personal agendas were not the only cause of downfall of the 1913 Assembly 
efforts at labor reform. Issues of reform brought with them a sense of political 
28 Ibid ., 169. 
29 Frances Doan Streightoff and Frank Hatch Stre ightoff, Indiana: A Social and Economic Survey 
(Indianapolis: W.K. Stewart Co., 1916), 61 . " Indiana City/Town Census Counts" 
30 Hoy, "Samuel Ralston," 54. 
3 1 Del Yicchio, " Indiana Politics," 197. 
32 Ibid., 196. 
33 Ibid. 
10 
ambiguity; what was good for one citizen was not always good for another. There was 
no clear-cut "balance between the common welfare and the rights of the individual 
citizen."34 The ambiguity made it easy for legislators to procrastinate and do nothing. 
The Democratic Party "had no particular mandate from the people; no enduring legacy of 
reform activity; and their constituency was not noticeably liberal or conservative."35 
After thirty years of being the minority in the Indiana legislature, they decided to take 
action rather than create passive laws that did not substantially ease the conditions of the 
average citizen. They did not feel like they could be associated with a failed legislature, 
and believed they could pass reform laws that were both popular and not radical. 36 
The issue of protective legislation was one that straddled the I ine between popular 
and radical. Protective legislation became popular in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, through the creation of laws that were meant to protect a certain class 
of workers. Early on, the legality of such laws was questioned, but after the Supreme 
Court's affirmation of the law' s constitutionality in the Muller v. Oregon case most states 
made the move to enact such legislation. In 1908, legendary attorney Louis Brandeis 
signed on to defend the state of Oregon against Curt Muller, a Portland laundry owner 
that required women to work beyond the ten hours that was stipulated in a law passed in 
1903 by Oregon ' s legislature. Disagreeing that his employees could not work overtime, 
William Fenton, Muller ' s lawyer and legal counsel for large companies such as Standard 
Oil , believed this law violated his right to freedom of contract, and challenged the 
constitutionality of the law in the Supreme Court.37 In the past, freedom of contract was 
34 Ibid. , 197. 
35 Ibid ., 199. 
36 Ibid ., 200. 
37 Woloch, Muller v. Oregon,. 21 . 
l l 
often what stopped legislatures from enacting protective legislation and was hailed as 
"the cornerstone of a fee society."38 Proponents of this view believed " legislatures 
retained practically no power to interfere with private arrangements between employers 
and employee. "39 Attorney Brandeis argued that freedom of contract could be controlled 
by the state to protect the health and welfare of its people.40 In his famous Brandeis brief, 
he worked to prove the relationship between long hours, worker's health, and public 
welfare, proving it was in society's best interest to uphold protective legislation for 
41 
women. 
According to Josephine Goldmark, a cowriter of the Muller brief, the changing 
technology and subdivi sion of tasks created new strain in industry. Women were 
expected to run more and more machinery without the opportunity to vary their work.42 
This created an increase in strain and monotony, leading to injuries ranging from cuts to 
maiming and scalping. Attorney Brandeis drew from other states decisions regarding 
protective legislation and their language of the inferiority of women. Since the early 
1900's, states had been arguing that women were weaker than men. The decision for a 
1902 Nebraska law went so far as to say, "Women and children [had] always, to a certain 
extent, been wards of the state."43 Likewise, the 1902 Washington decision upholding 
protective legislation stated: 
38 Urofsky, "State Courts," 66. 
39 Ibid . 
40 The Lochner ( 1905) deci sion argues that the l 4'h amendment prohibits the government from interfering 
in business, and protects the freedom of contract. While the Muller decision was upheld, it was because the 
workers in question were women as opposed to men, like those in the Lochner decision. The Muller 
decision, in light of the Lochner decision, allowed for the discrimination based on sex of employees. The 
two decisions, just three years apart, show the contlicted nature of the American lega l system on this issue. 
4 1 Woloch, Muller v. Oregon, 3. 
42 Lehrer, Origins of Protective Labor Legislalion, 28. 
43 Ibid ., 57. 
12 
It is a matter of universal knowledge with all reasonably intelligent people 
of the present age that continuous standing on the feet by women for a 
great many consecutive hours is deleterious to their health. lt must 
logically follow that that which would deleteriously affect any great 
number of women who are the mother of succeeding generations must 
necessarily affect the public welfare and the public morals.44 
Brandeis's argument, like those that had come before him to protect the 
constitutionality of protective legislation, was based on scientific facts of the day arguing 
that women were inherently weaker than men and thus, as mothers of the race, they 
needed protecting from the ills of industrialization. Brandeis maintained that "the 
deterioration is handed down in succeeding generations" and "the overwork for future 
mothers thus directly attacks the welfare of the nation."45 Studies of the day proved that 
there was a real danger to wage work. In her book, Out to Work: A Histmy ~l Wage-
Earning Women in the United States (1983), historian Alice Kessler-Harris, found that 
working women were 
nearly always undernourished. Few had sufficient air, sunshine, or 
exercise. Those who worked at sewing machines developed spinal 
problems, digestive disorders, and frequently consumption. Saleswomen, 
forced to stand from 10 to 12 hours a day, got varicose veins. Textile 
workers sickened with brown lung disease. 'No girl of 18 can work 
without physical injury, sit or stand continuously in the most sanitary 
store, laundry, or factory I 0 hours a day without risking her chance for 
future usefulness as a woman.' said one expert. Tales abounded of heads 
scalped by machines, bodies burned by flying cinders, and hands mangled 
by untended machinery. It said that subjecting future mothers of the race 
to these evils would produce, in the jargon of the day, stunted and dwarfed 
children.46 
With this evidence, Brandeis's use of sociological jurisprudence, through a focus on the 
social effects of law, was difficult to argue with. By considering the effects of a such a 
4
·
1 Ibid., 58 .. 
45 Woloch, Muller v. Oregon, 3. 
46 Alice Kessler-Harris, Out to Work: a His101y of' Wage- Earning Wom en in the Unit ed States (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 1983), I 06. 
13 
-
law, or in this case, the absence of protective legislation would have on society, Brandeis 
provided a new way for reformers to argue for protective legislation in hopes of reaching 
their broader goal , protection by the state of all workers. Contemporary analysis of the 
Muller case note that this decision 
sharply distinguished what was appropriate for men and what was 
desirable for women. Arguing that the state had an interest in women ' s 
present and future roles of actual mothers and as 'mother' s of the race,' 
the Court upheld Oregon's effort to reduce the hours of women workers. 
It thereby inscribed into precedent notions that women, all of whom could 
be viewed as potential mothers, constituted a separate class and a proper 
subject for legislative action.47 
Over the course of the next several decades, the Muller decision allowed legislation to be 
created that limited maximum hours and night labor for women workers. 48 
Indiana's Sixty-Eighth General Assembly Session opened on Thursday, January 
9, 1913 and on Tuesday, January 14, 191 3, House Bill No. 47 was introduced. The bi ll 
addressed the "hours of labor of women" and was sent immediately to the Committee on 
Labor.49 The bill, nicknamed Keegan's bill after Representative John Keegan, a 
Democrat from Indianapolis, who introduced the bill , "provided for an eight-hour 
working day for women. "50 In a state that had no protection of women workers, this 
legislation was seen as very radical to some. Almost immediately, the bill drew strong 
responses from pro-labor and pro-employer camps. Three days after the bill was 
introduced, on January l i'\ the Indianapolis Star reported that "the Indiana 
Manufacturers' and Shippers ' Association wi ll begin a fight ... against" the bill.51 The 
association proved to be a rallying organization for employers who disliked it. Just a 
47 Wikander et al , Protecting Women. 338. 
48 Ibid ., 342 . 
49 Indiana Genera l Assembly, House Journal, 68'11 session, 9 January 191 3, 85. 
50 
" Eight-Hour Day Bi ll Under Fire," Indianapolis Siar, 17 January 191 3, 16. 
5 1 
"Eight Hour Day Bil l under Fire ." 
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week later J.V. Zartman, a representative for the organization, argued that readjusting 
women's work schedules would force men to work eight hours too, which would be 
costly and lead to an increase in the price of products.s2 Proponents of the bill , such as 
Mr. Tobin from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters rebuked this claim saying, 
"Do you not know that Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Beveridge, and Mr. Johnson and your party 
platform called for this sort of legislation, for the 8-hour day for women in industry. ,,s3 
Tobin's statement highlighted the push by union leaders to remind the legislatures of 
their campaign promises. With the high turnover in the political landscape, these threats 
could have a real political impact in the next election cycle. 
Employers argued that the bill "if passed, would mean ruin of hundreds of Indiana 
manufacturers."s4 Furthermore, opponents of the bill believed that in relation to the other 
states in the area, they would lose a competitive edge.ss Limiting women's working 
hours per day would discourage new industries from opening factories in the state, or, 
worse, drive away the factories that were already here. In an effort to halt the passage of 
this bill , the Manufacturer's and Shippers' Association wrote letters to other employers 
they believed would be against the bill and requested their attendance at the House Labor 
Committee hearing three days later. s6 During the hearing, many manufacturers protested 
the hour limitations that the bill proposed. Some argued that reducing hours would 
reduce profits, causing lower wages for the women.s7 A Fort Wayne company believed 
there would be a 35% cut in output in his factory and they would be forced to compete 
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with businesses in "New England, the South, Pennsylvania and Germany, where the girls 
work from ten to twelve hours a day."58 
Yet the fight was more than just about competition from other markets. It became 
a fight over political ideology and, at times, it was personal. In an Indianapolis Star 
article about the hearing, a Fort Wayne manufacturer was quoted saying this about the 
bill: "It is not the working people that are so much interested in this bill , but the parasites 
whom they are supporting. There is a man living in Indianapolis now, a member of this 
Legislature, who pays $50 a month house rent, dresses in the latest styles and lives in 
luxury, yet he never works. Such men as this are promoting the bill."59 Employers 
believed the actions of politicians in Indianapolis were imposing unfair laws on them 
though they were not affected by its outcomes. It was easy for lawmakers to restrict the 
hours that factories could run without incurring any of the possible revenue losses as a 
result. 
On February 11 1\ the Committee on Labor reported back to the legislature. Of 
the thirteen members, only three wished the bill to be indefinitely postponed, while eight 
wanted it to pass with some substitutions and two believed it should pass as is.60 An 
Assembly vote was held two days later to decide the outcome of the bill, after a great deal 
of debate. Three amendments were proposed, fatally altering the character of 
Representative Keegan's initial bill. The amendments allowed for more than a 9-hour 
workday, as long as the hours were fewer than I 0 a day and 54 a week. 61 Senator Keegan 
was enraged by the failure of his bill, and moved to strike the enacting clause in an effort 
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to kill the bill, but it failed to pass.62 He declared he was resigning as a result of the vote. 
The coverage of his resignation made the front page of the Indianapolis Star. arguably 
the state's leading paper, where he was quoted saying, "We have an 8-hour law for men 
in Indiana and I have resigned rather than remain a member of a body which would 
require women and girls, whom men ought to protect, to work ten hours a day- two 
hours longer than we ask men employed on state contracts to work."63 He accused 
manufacturing establishments of being the reason that the bill had failed , believing that 
they placed "a can of corn" above a human life.64 Governor Ralston did not accept his 
resignation, but his stunt did bring greater publicity to the issue. 
The newspaper coverage of the amendments was harsh in Indianapolis. On the 
16111, the Star reported: 
Speaker Cook engineered a parliamentary coup in the House yesterday 
morning by which the fifty-hour-a-week clause in Keegan ' s 'eight-hour 
work day' bill for women was stricken out, and the word 'fifty' was 
substituted for 'fifty-four. ' The Amendment is a big concession to the 
labor element and was put in by Representative Weisman, one of the chief 
f 1 65 opponents o t 1e measure. 
Furthermore, the local labor paper, the labor Bulletin, had a scathing review of the 
Legislature and their actions, arguing the defeat "places the legislature on record as 
destitute of a proper regard for womanhood ."66 The article also questions the future 
ramifications of the failure of this bill , saying, "What will future generations think of a 
state which discriminated against women in l 913?"67 While the paper had relatively 
sporadic coverage of the protective legislation debate, the articles they did publish on the 
62 
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-
subject were particularly supp011ive of the law, and similar laws all over the country. 
The paper placed blame for the bill's failure in a variety of places. Generally on the 
subject of working women, the paper notes, "It is discouraging to note how many people 
try to shield the big stores and factories from any blame in the matter, especially the big 
daily papers, which could exert a wholesome influence against low wages. These papers 
belittle the effort being made to get better wages for women. They purposely evade and 
. l . ,,68 
misrepresent t 1e cont~nt1on. 
While the eight-hour bill was a failure, the Assembly did not give up on passing a 
law for working women. A substitute measure, known as the Dickinson-Koenig bill for 
the representatives sponsoring the bill, was passed in the House on February 22, 1913, 
and was proposed by representatives J.R. Dickinson of Huntington and Charles Koeni g of 
Fort Wayne, both Democrats. This bill provided for a nine-hour day and fifty-hour week. 
Representatives on both sides of the bill argued during discussion that they had received 
scores of letters from both women and manufacturers arguing for and against the bill. 
Some representatives believed that this bill was solely for the benefit of Representative 
Keegan, in an attempt to get him to return to the Legislature.69 While the bill passed by a 
large majority, 65 to 24, more than half of the members spoke about their position on the 
bill.70 The Indianapolis Star highlighted representatives that spoke against the bill , 
quoting those that voted no based on their convictions, their constituents, and for 
Keegan 's actions. 71 The Senate referred the bill back to the committee on labor and held 
a hearing for the public to discuss their opinions on the matter. 
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The hearing held on February 28111 became largely a personal battle between the 
legislators, which took center stage in the Indianapolis Star coverage of the hearing 
above the actual discussion about the bill. Senator Robert Glenn Van Auken, a Democrat 
from Steuben County, challenged the right of Representative Keegan to speak at the 
hearing after Keegan referred to the Legislature as "leprous."72 The personal 
disagreements that occurred during the hearing downplayed the other important 
happenings that occmTed, such as American Federation of Labor leader, Samuel 
Gompers speaking in support of the bill. Gompers highlighted the benefit of this law was 
not just women alone, but for the freedom of employers as well. Because hours would be 
lowered, wages could be raised and employers would have a greater pool of candidates 
from which to select the best laborers.73 Although he was in the city to attend that 
national convention of the Iron Workers Union, Gomper' s position as a well-known labor 
leader made his attendance and speech at the meeting a huge vote of support for the bill. 
The rest of the discussion was largely split by employers against women and union men. 
A local department store worker, Mrs. G.G. Andrews, testified about the risk women took 
when speaking out in favor of the bill , noting that by coming she had risked her 
position.74 It was an uncertainty many women were not willing to take and led to a lack 
of women' s voices both in the newspapers and later during the committee hearings. 
After the hearing, the Committee on Labor reported back to the Senate that they 
recommended the passage of the bill. However, the bill continued to evoke strong 
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responses from the legislators and they debated the bill on March 4111 for three hours 
before they voted on it. The public response to the vote was immense. Indiana State 
Federation of Clubs president Luella Mc Whirter, realizing the vote was in danger, sent 
postcards urging women who were interested to attend the hearing. "Heavy pressure 
against it. Come if possible. Urge others. Presence of hundreds of women needed for 
influence." 75 Her clipped message highlighted the dire situation of the bill. Senators 
voted against the bill for a variety of reasons. Several Senators believed that the bill was 
written poorly because it distinguished between men and women, a few went so far as to 
argue that the law would adversely affect men by forcing them to work nine hours as 
well , and others believed such a bill was unenforceable. As with the eight-hour bill , there 
were strong protests from manufacturers and employers of labor that encouraged the 
failure of the law. Regardless of those who spoke out in favor of the bill , the bill lost by a 
margin of 19 to 29.76 
Truly determined to enact a law to limit the hours of working women in the State, 
the day after the defeat of the Dickinson-Koenig bill the House introduced a third bill for 
working women. This bill was sponsored by Representatives Harry Gardner, a Democrat 
from Logansport, and James Fleming, a Democrat from Portland, and would limit the 
hours of employment to ten hours a day and fifty-four a week. 77 From the beginning it 
was questionable whether the Senate would pass the bill , when a motion to amend the 
Dickinson-Koenig bill to the same provisions failed. The bill passed the House on March 
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gth but it was opposed by Hoosier union workers "who declared it to be a mere makeshift 
and a compromise at the expense of the working women."78 
Numerous members spoke out on the uselessness of the bill. Representative 
James Dunmire, a Democrat from Elkhart stated, " lf I wanted to play politics I would get 
on the wagon and support this makeshift law now proposed, but I don ' t believe in making 
a compromise at the expense of the working women in this state."79 He also argued that 
the failure of the law was a reflection of the Democratic Party and their failure to protect 
women. Representative Koenig declared "Now after bills which would have really given 
some relief have been killed, we are asked to vote for a bill which is wholly 
unsatisfactory and of practically no benefit. I refuse to endorse such a makeshift with my 
vote."80 Other members were more candid in their responses; Representative Dickinson 
simply called it "useless" and Representative George Sands, a Democrat from South 
Bend said, "this bill means nothing and will give no relief." 81 Representative William 
Patton, a Democrat from Bedford, argued, "the men would not dare to fight laws 
proposed in the interest of working women if we had women lawmakers here, and I hope 
the day is not far off when they will grace this chamber."82 In addressing the lack of 
political power women had, he highlights an argument that few others did over the course 
of the fight for working women. The weak political agency of women was commented 
on in a Labor Bulletin article from 1911 , stating a cigar factory in Evansville "does not 
frighten law-makers very much as the girls have no votes."83 Because women did not yet 
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have the vote, politicians had very little incentive to anger wealthy businessmen by 
limiting the hours of their workers. Most assemblymen, except, perhaps, for Keegan, 
were unwilling to risk their political career for an unpopular law with their constituents. 
Political parties meant nothing when it came to a law for women, and 
representatives voted for their own personal agenda. Often, legislators voting records 
were inconsistent, and representatives changed their vote from one labor bill to the next, 
such as Representative Charles Bidwell, a Democrat from Sullivan county, who voted 
against Keegan's bill, for the Dickinson-Koenig bill, and abstained for the Gardner-
Fleming bill. Furthermore, representatives were not above blaming the failure of the bills 
on their own party. Angered by the loss, Representative Keegan publically called 
Democratic state chairman, Bernard Korbly, a "paid lobbyist" who was partially behind 
the defeat of the previous two bills.84 Regardless, the bill passed the House, only to fail 
in the Senate in early March of 1913. 
After the failure of the Dickinson-Koenig bill in the Senate, a measure was 
introduced to provide for a commission that would travel the state in an effort to 
investigate the conditions of women in labor and aim to represent a variety of interests. 
This bill, seen as a concession after the failure to pass a law regulating hours, was passed 
by both the House and the Senate. This act was approved on March 14, 1913. The 
charge of the commission was to "investigate the hours and conditions of labor of women 
in this State and to determine what limitations, if any, should be placed on the hours of 
labor of women in any or all employments, or what improvement should be made in the 
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conditions under which women labor in any or all employments."85 It was stipulated that 
the commission was to be made up of five members to represent the interests of 
employers, women, lawmakers, and the public. These members were chosen by 
Governor Ralston and he received numerous letters from all over the state recommending 
a variety of people for the different positions.86 It should be noted that an Indianapolis 
Star article recounting the selection of the commission members notes that all the men 
. D 87 l h . d . chosen for the committee were emocrats. n t eory, it ma e sense to appomt 
members who had different interests in an effort to make sure the right questions were 
asked, however the real problem became that the members just had too many ideological 
differences. 
The chairman of the commission was Melville Mix , who was chosen to represent 
the public. Mix was the president and general manager of Dodge Manufacturing 
Company in Mishawaka. Additionally, he was president of the Manufacturers ' Bureau of 
Indiana as late as 1912. 88 At different times from 1910 to 1912, he wrote for or was 
featured in the Indianapolis Star to address issues of the Manufacturers ' Bureau in the 
state, making him a well-known person throughout the state. Although he was chosen to 
lead the commission and to represent the needs of the public, his background clearly 
positioned him towards less restrictive labor laws and away from the protection of 
women employees. His connection to the Manufacturers' Bureau, which later merged to 
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become the Manufacturers' and Shippers' Association, colored his view of the 
commission throughout their work in the state. 
Lee Rodman was chosen to represent employers. He was from Cannelton and 
was head of Indiana Cotton Mills. Prior to his appointment to the commission, Rodman 
was actively against the bill. He was cited in a Star article as speaking out against the bill 
during the Senate hearing on the Dickinson-Koenig law.89 H.J Conway was selected to 
represent labor. He was from Lafayette and was head of the National Retail Clerks 
Union. Like Mix, Conway was also featured in the Star several times for the role he 
played in the 1912 Lafayette clerk's strike, as secretary and treasurer of the Union and a 
spokesperson for the strikers. 
The last two members of the commission- those representing the legislature and 
women- were chosen and then replaced before the commission even began. Democratic 
Senator Harry Grube of Plymouth was initially selected to be a part of the commission; 
however he resigned based on business matters. Senator Grube made the original 
proposal for the commission at the beginning of March 1913 but resigned without 
specifics at the first meeting of the commission in May. Senator Grube was originally 
appointed as the chairman of the commission, and upon his resignation Lee Rodman 
expressed concern in a letter to Governor Ralston that his resignation "in the midst of our 
investigations, makes our report and findings more vulnerable to attacks of this kind."90 
Senator Frederick Van Nuys from Anderson, another Democrat, was chosen to replace 
Senator Grube. Bertha Lockwood of lndianapolis was chosen to be the woman 's 
representative on the commission. Lockwood was active in the community and served as 
89 
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chairman of the legislative committee of the Women's Department Club of Indianapolis. 
She was also a member of the State Federation of Clubs.91 Lockwood was very well 
known among women's clubs, as well as by the Legislature where she lobbied for 
refonns centered on women and children.92 Unfortunately, Mrs. Lockwood died in the 
summer of 1914, just a fow months before the commission was set to begin holding 
hearings. It was commonly believed that her death was attributed to her work with the 
commission. Frank and Frances Streightoff, in Indiana: a Social and Economic Survey, 
argue, "Mrs. Bertha J. Lockwood literally worked herself to death on this commission ' s 
task."93 A Star article about her death noted, "Her interest in the work of that 
commission [on working women's conditions] was so keen that she over-exerted 
herself."94 Mae Romig Miller was originally chosen to be the secretary of the 
commission but after Lockwood's death, the Governor choose to have her fill the vacant 
position. Like Lockwood, Miller was an active member of the clubwomen ' s movement 
and worked for the passage of the 8-hour law, speaking at the House's committee hearing 
for Keegan's bill. 
Together, Melville Mix, Lee Rodman, H.J. Conway, Senator Fredrick Van Nuys, 
and Mae Romig Miller were appropriated $2,000 from the legislature to travel the state 
and hold hearings that would inform the Assembly on the laws that need to be created to 
best aide working women. Because the commission was appropriated such a meager 
sum, and did not receive a salary for their work, the commission reached out to the 
United States Department of Labor to assist with their data collection. The Department 
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of Labor report was compiled by Marie Obenauer, who traveled with the conunission to a 
number of hearings throughout the state. Her findings were laid out in a 198 page report 
entitled "Hours, Earnings, and Conditions of Labor of Women in Indiana Mercantile 
Establishments and Garment Factories" ( 19 14). The report was officially released by the 
Department of Labor in October of 1914, but Obenauer met with the commission during 
their first meeting in Indianapolis in May.95 Additionally, her report gives an overview of 
the commission 's findings, so they were available to other such investigations all over the 
nation. The Department of Labor was already in the process of recording the conditions 
of women in labor across the United States in the hope of making reconm1endations to 
Congress about industrial problems, similar to the charge of the Indiana commission.96 
The Department of Labor accepted the commission 's request in a hope that the 
cooperation would create uniform methods of classifying and collecting data that could 
be extrapolated to other areas in the country. Mrs. Obenauer's report focused on the 
manufacturing and mercantile establishments in the state, as they employ 45% of the 
30,000 working women.97 This arrangement allowed the Indiana commission to devote 
its funds to corresponding with the other industries that employ women. The Department 
of Labor study covered the same ten cities that the commission planned to cover. Ten 
cities were chosen in an effort to cover the entire state and represent the experiences of 
women in a variety of locations. The cities that were chosen were Indianapoli s, Peru, 
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Richmond, South Bend, Hammond, Lafayette, Terre Haute, Evansville, Fort Wayne, and 
New Albany.98 
In an effort to gather data from both sides of the question, employers and 
employees both were given questio1maires to fill out. Data was obtained on seasons, 
hours, overtime, occupations, and earning. Interviews were taken with the employer 
when necessary or data was retrieved tlu-ough records, such as payroll, when available.99 
Employees were interviewed for questions of nationality , age, work conditions, and 
employment and earnings. 100 The result of this data provided a base of information for 
examination of witnesses during the hearings . 
While the commission was supposed to start their hearings in the summer of 
1914, the death of Belva Lockwood forced them to postpone their visits until September 
of 1914. Although they had over a year and a half to collect data, visit the cities and hold 
hearings, and create a recommendation, the hearings took just twelve days, spanning 
from September 14111 to the 25111 • In an effort to gather opinions from both sides of the 
question, hearings were held in both the afternoon and evening. While these meetings 
were open to the public, the afternoon meeting was intended for employers and the 
evening for the employees to voice their opinions. 
A prevailing problem from hearing to hearing was the lack of discussion on both 
sides of the labor question. The labor hearings were often fairly well attended, though 
people did not talk. At the Peru hearing, no one appeared during the afternoon session, 
and while twenty men and three women attended the evening session, none of them 
98 For the survey of the Department of Labor, Muncie was studied as opposed to Peru for an unknown 
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spoke. 101 In the two sessions in South Bend, nine men spoke but just one woman voiced 
her opinion. Chairman Mix noted that they could 11ot get a ri se out of employees during 
the evening hearing, which was devoted to their thoughts on the issue. The South Bend 
News Times believed the evening hearing there, "from the standpoint of announced 
purposes, resembled a farce." 102 Not one woman spoke during the Richmond, New 
Albany, or Evansville commission. An Indianapolis News article recounting the Terre 
Haute hearing noted, "A few factories were represented by the employers side, but no one 
was present to speak for employes [sic]." 103 A Fort Wayne newspaper the day after their 
hearings was titled "Working Women's Inquiry Fails to Arouse Interest." 104 
A lack of testimony by employees was one of the largest problems in all hearings. 
Mae Miller noted during the opening remarks at the Lafayette hearing that "We are 
disappointed in not seeing a larger number present this evening [of women and 
employees], however we might add that it has been like this all during the week." 105 lt 
was widely theorized that the reason for employee 's poor attendance was related to 
threats and intimidation by their employers. This was no surprise as threats by employers 
had been noted during the legislative hearings. Conway was under the impression, "the 
women in employed in industries today such as stores and manufacturing institutions 
have expressed their fear of loss of employment, if they give testimony before these 
hearings." 106 Because of Conway 's participation in labor unions, he utilized those 
connections to recruit those in local communities who were sympathetic to the bill to 
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attend the hearings. However, he received letters from those contacts stating, "unless 
they were granted some authority or some credentials they feared to act voluntarily." 107 
A South Bend News Times article from the day after their hearing noted that "These girls 
seemingly thought too well of their pay envelopes to hazard it by expressing opinion." 108 
Although participation and attendance by employees was an issue, the 
commission was granted the abi lity to subpoena witnesses. However, the commissioners, 
through a great deal of di sagreement and discussion, decided to not utilize this. Conway 
wanted to use John Doe subpoenas, but Rodman and Mix objected. Rodman argued that 
they could not force people to testify, and that the average individual had a great 
1 d k . f' f' d I 09 re uctance to get up an spea m ront o a crow . 
Another reason for poor employee attendance was a sheer lack of accessible 
information about the hearings. In the week leading up to the South Bend hearing, the 
newspaper ran just one twenty-six line article on the bottom of the ninth page about the 
event. 110 However, it was not just employees who were unaware of the hearings, in Terre 
Haute, Stella Stimson, chairman of the industrial committee for the State Federation of 
Women's Clubs, spent the better part of the day inquiring about when and where the 
commission would hold its hearing. 111 The poor turnout was more than just a result of 
bad newspaper coverage, the working girls in some cities had no idea the commission 
existed. A woman testified in Lafayette saying she had visited several working girls that 
morning and when she brought up the commission, none of them seemed to know 
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anything about it. She stated, "we have fourteen year old girls employed in our carpet 
factories here and yet none of them seemed to understand that there was anything going 
on in their interest." 112 
The lack of response from employees in the hearings can be largely attributed to 
working women's hesitancy to unionize. Without a union, it was difficult to create a 
coherent voice on opinions and wants, making it difficult to portray those wishes to the 
Legislature. Women's hesitancy to unionize also made it easier for employers to force 
them to work in poor conditions. Without collective bargaining, women had nothing to 
leverage when they desperately needed better conditions. Women were antiunion 
because they believed their time in the workforce was temporary. While Miller made an 
effort to make organized labor aware of the hearings, a Lafayette unionist noted, "the 
majority of women do not recognize the necessity of organization. They expect to work 
for a few years only and then get married.'' 113 Those that did wish to organize had a 
difficult time of it, as it was noted during the Lafayette commission that "the largest 
employers notified their employers that they would be discharged if they joined the 
organization." 114 Social nonns dictated that proper women stopped working after 
marriage, as it was a husband's job to care for his wife's needs and women were needed 
in the home, so women saw their employment as temporary. In reality, there were 
thousands of women who worked after marriage for a variety of reasons, such as injury or 
death of a spouse or financial strain. Although the guarantee that work was temporary 
was often false, women's antiunion position did not change. 
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The overall conditions of women in labor were incredibly hard to decipher. The 
Department of Labor's survey had compiled cold, hard facts that were difficult to dispute. 
Testimony from both employers and employees included self-proclaimed 'facts ' that 
were impossible to verify by the commissioners and must be taken at face value for the 
purposes of inquiry. While very few women spoke during the hearings, Governor 
Ralston received close to a hw1dred letters and telegrams from working women all over 
the state. However, women's opinion on protective legislation was both positive and 
negative. Interestingly, women who wrote letters often wished for the bill to be passed, 
while those who telegraphed the Governor did not want the law. While there is no way to 
tell why this happened, it is possible that the telegrams did not actually come from the 
women. 
Losing a competitive edge with men was the foremost concern of women in 
regards to a maximum hour limit. Women were paid less than men were though they 
worked similar hours, but this law would encourage employers to hire men over women 
since they could work longer. Representatives from Ideal Laundry and Dry Cleaning 
company telegraphed the Governor, concerned a law would "put [them] out of 
competition with men and deprive [them] of positions which are womanly and 
honorable." 11 5 The loss of employment as a result of this law could force women into 
unsavory positions such as working in a saloon or prostitution. In contrast to wage work 
in industry, prostitution could pay as much as $25 a week, and offer flexibility in terms of 
11 5 Telegraph from Ideal Laundry and Dry Cleaning to Governor Samue l Ralston , I March 191 5, Box I 18, 
folder 2 , Governor's Papers, ISA. 
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hours and clients. 116 It was a viable option for women who faced a loss of employment 
from their respectable positions as a result of this law. 
However, dozens of women wrote to Governor Ralston expressing their wish for 
shorter hours. They often expressed how much the shorter hours would mean to them. 
The few women who wrote about the employment conditions they endured were 
startling. A South Bend depattment store worker wrote that many women worked 
between 1 o and 14 hours, and often have to "offend Sunday getting our clothes a11d 
bodies in conditions to work the following 6 days." 117 Work consumed every moment of 
a woman's life, making it difficult to attend to personal needs. Another South Bend 
woman stated, 
you do not understand what it means to work from 10 to 14 hours 
every day week in and week out ... These are the very conditions that drive 
women into the streets. For when my days have been the hardest, at1d I 
was worn out both physically and mentally I left desperate enough not to 
do anything ... The men who are fighting this law are fighting it for selfish 
reasons. They do not realize what they are doing. Being men they cannot 
believe what it means to us .. . The wives and daughters of these same men 
d 1 . l" . 118 may someday be force to earn t 1eir own 1v111g. 
Of the letters that Governor Ralston received, more than half of them were requesting the 
law to pass. Although these personal anecdotes were few and far between, women were 
suffering and they looked to Governor Ralston for some reprieve. 
As it has been previously noted, women's attendance at commission hearings was 
mediocre at best. The women who did speak during the commission all spoke about the 
importance and need of a law limiting working hours based on their personal experiences 
11 6 
"Severe Arraignment of Employers; Cheap Labor Driving G iris to Run ," Labor Bulletin, 14 April 19 1 I, 
I. 
117 Letter from Clara Steniel to Governor Samuel Ralston, 26 January 191 3, Box I 18, folder 2, Governor's 
Papers, ISA . 
118 L 1. etter mm Anna Rader to Governor Ralston , 27 January 191 3, Box 118, folder 2, Governor's Papers, 
ISA . 
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of long hours and low pay. Mrs. Lane, a restaurant cook from Fort Wayne recounted her 
experience of alternating between 11 and 13-hour work days, including Sundays and 
holidays with no paid days off In addition to long work days, she is given no time to rest 
and is on her feet all the time. Based on her experience, she noted, "when you stand on 
your feet all the time I think 8 hours is plenty for a lady to work." 119 Mrs. Lane also 
noted that many girls working in kitchens are not treated well , making it impossible for a 
girl to pay room rent and clothe herself on such a small salary. 120 
In fact, average weekly wages were a contested topic from hearing to hearing by 
commissioners, employers, community members, and employees, as well as a question 
that was being surveyed and studied all over the country. Overwhelmingly, studies 
showed that working women were not making enough money to provide a decent life for 
themselves. The Department of Labor study done earlier in the year was able to provide 
the commissioners with accurate average weekly wages for women in all ten of the cities 
visited. Utilizing those facts, the commissioners, but largely Miller, were able to 
question employers and employees on the topic of wages. The average wage of women 
from each city varied from $6.23 in New Albany to $8.77 in South Bend.121 When 
looking at the wages of all the cities, "a little more than half of the women were receiving 
rates of pay less than $7 a week, 48 per cent of the saleswomen, according to individual 
reports, were earning less than this amount." 122 However, often testimony during the 
commission was contrary to this data. Several women in the Fort Wayne hearing argued 
119 Commission on Working Women in Fort Wayne, 14 September 1914, box 14, folder I, Industrial 
Board, ISA, 3. 
120 Ibid ., 4. 
12 1 Department of Labor, Hours, Earnings, and Conditions. 33 . See the Appendix for a full table of the 
wages paid to women in each of the ten cities per the data collected by the Department of Labor. 
122 Ibid. , 39. 
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that women in factories and department stores in the city were making upwards of $10 a 
week, which was unrealistic based on the Department of Labor data. Threats from 
employers or fear of the loss of their position are plausible reasons why these women 
would have so severely misrepresented their wages. Similarly, employers were equally 
guilty of misrepresenting the wages they paid A garment manufacturer in Tene Haute 
told the commission that it was possible for his pieceworkers to make between $16 and 
$18 for 8 to 9 hours of labor, a fact that was true for perhaps one small fraction of his 
workforce. 123 While average wages were between $6 and $8 in all cities, inexperienced 
girls made significantly lower wages when they started. The Lincoln Cotton Mill in 
Evansville paid their inexperienced girls just $3 a week, although the representative noted 
in the hearing that all of those girls lived at home. 124 However, he acknowledged that he 
does not make it a habit to inquire about their living arrangements during the hiring 
125 process. 
A question of wages also brought up the issue of the cost of living, which was 
addressed in a number of hearings. Conway attempted to break down the cost of living in 
Evansville for an average woman. He accounted $5 .50 for room and board, $0.75 for 
laundry, $0.50 for carfare and $2.97 for clothes, recreation and educational activities, 
church, and doctor' s appointments, for a total of $9. 72 a week. This was several dollars 
above the average that girls were making across the state. However, Conway 's expense 
budget highlighted a real problem in thousands of girl 's lives. Wages were not enough to 
account for all of the expenses that could arise for a young working girl alone in the city . 
123 Commission on Working Women in Terre Haute, 24 September 191 4, box 14, folder 8, Industrial Board 
Records, ISA, 4 . 
124 Commission on Working Women in Evansvi lie, 23 September 1914, box 14, folder 7, Industrial Board 
Records, ISA, 5. 
125 Ibid . 
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Seven dollars a week could not account for winter clothes, a daily newspaper, or an 
unexpected illness. A day of illness could mean "trips to the pawnbroker, meager 
dinners, a weakened will, often a plunge into the abyss from which she so often never 
escapes." 126 When looking at the cost of living in Hammond, Miller noted that a girls 
" pleasures and education, or anything she chooses for herself, her clothes, are not in 
consideration of the average wage of the working girl in Hammond if she does not make 
over $7 or $7.50 a week." 127 Because girls made such poor wages, they were forced to 
sew most of their clothes themselves in an effort to save money. An Indianapolis Star 
miicle titled, "Working Girls and Their Clothing," notes how most women work all day 
and sew clothes by night, stating, "The spectacle of a girl who works all day in an office 
or factory sitting up half the night to make a garment to wear the next day is one whose 
incongruity never strikes the persons who lay down the law for such women." 128 The 
article also addresses how men are never expected to come home and work on other tasks 
after work, but are able to enjoy leisure "for the restoration of his vitality." 129 Women 
simply did not have the time or the money to concern themselves with their 'vitality' . 
Leisure and education was another activity that women were forced to forego as a 
result of long hours and low wages. With long hours, women had no time for self-
improvement through education. A male union leader noted this in hi s Terre Haute 
commission testimony. He stated, "Women who work I 0 hours a day at physical toil is 
not going to get much education in the rest of the 24 hours. You take fa ir conditions and a 
living wage away from any laboring person and you just about kill all the better 
126 
"Severe Arraignment of Employers; Cheap Labor Driving G iris to Run." 
127 Commission on Working Women in Hammond, 16 September 19 14, box 14, folder 2, Industrial Board 
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incentives that is in that person. I find that the better paid our workmen are, the better 
citizens they make and the better employees they make." 130 A lack of wages and time for 
self-improvement meant a woman had no means of improving her economic conditions. 
Night school was offered in South Bend, but as Miller told her fellow commissioners 
although she pushed women workers to go, they simply could not compete or keep up. 
"They said by the time they left their work and walked home, because they couldn ' t 
afford to ride, and put on a clean waist and came all the way back they were physically 
too tired to get any benefit of our public school education. They had stopped school-
that is day school-to go to work." 131 While the commission was not so interested in the 
wages of women, it became abundantly clear that long hours and low wages went hand-
in-hand. Together, they had the ability to break any working girl, often forcing them into 
immoral lives of prostitution. 
Although employers and women workers had the most at stake, other groups 
expressed interest in the outcome of protective legislation. Union men generally argued 
for the bill, but because of self-interest. They believed if working hours were limited, 
women would be fired in favor of men who had no restrictions on their labor. Indiana 
labor unions were not overtly vocal about the bill for women, but they often attended 
meetings and hearings, occasionally speaking out for the bill. At the Terre Haute 
hearing, Mr. Fox, a secretary for the mineworkers union argued in favor of the law based 
on women's more delicate constitution, stating, "It is a well-established fact that eight 
hours is enough for a man to work in this country, and why then should we ask our 
13° Commission on Working Women in Terre Haute, 24 September 1914, box 14 , folder 8, Industrial Board 
Papers, ISA, 35. 
13 1 Commission on Working Women in South Bend, 17 September 1914, box 14, folder 3, Industri al Board 
Papers, ISA, 26. 
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women to work longer."132 His statement was filled with patriarchal ideals of a woman' s 
place in the home and their physical frailty, but nonetheless articulated his support of a 
law that would help thousands of women all over the state. Clubwomen were also 
interested in the bill. Beginning in the early twentieth century, privileged upper class 
women created social organizations that focused on progressive movements that would 
right the many ills of society. In Indiana, the State Federation of Clubs was the foremost 
women's organization, and beginning in 1907 took an interest in the conditions of 
working women. 133 However, in the fight for protective legislation, a majority of their 
work was limited to sporadic lobbying. Clubwomen, like Stella Stimson as mentioned 
earlier, often attended hearings and legislative sessions, but in relation to their other 
causes, the plight of working women was not a pressing issue. 
In contrast to employees, almost all employers were ardently against any form of 
protective legislation. One of the biggest concerns of employers was the competition 
from other states. Indiana ' s proximity to Chicago, Cincinnati, and Louisville made 
employers believe that a maximum hour law would place them at a disadvantage to the 
surrounding cities. However, with the advent of railroads and canals, industries in 
Indiana were in competition with New England, the South, and parts of Europe. 
Employer's argued was that Indiana would not be able to compete with the bordering 
states that did not have laws similar to those that were in question in Indiana. A majority 
of the cities that held hearings were in close proximity to large cities in surrounding 
states. Hammond was close to Chicago, New Albany was near Louisville and Richmond 
was not far from Dayton. Employers recounted tales of the failure of protective laws in 
132 Commiss ion on Working Women in Terre Haute, 24 September 1914, box 14, folder 8, Industrial Board 
Papers, ISA, 35 . 
133 
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other states, telling of telegraph operators that lost their jobs when a law was enacted in 
Ohio, forcing them to come to Indiana for positions. 134 A manufacturer in Hammond 
argued that competition was already affecting business, and restricting women's hours 
would be disastrous. 135 Indianapolis manufacturers argued that a reduction of hours from 
60 to 55 a week would result in a loss of revenue, while Western Union threatened that 
128 women would be fired in favor of men employees. 136 
Though protective legislation was a relatively new legal route, states all over the 
country were creating commissions and enacting laws. While manufacturers claimed to 
be the only state in the area considered enacting protective legislation, at the time of the 
commission laws limiting hours were already on the books in Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, 
and Wisconsin. Michigan limited hours to 54 a week, Illinois had a 10-hour a day law, 
Ohio ' s law stipulated ten hours a day or 54 a week and Wisconsin required women work 
no more than 10 hours a day or 55 a week. 137 Furthermore, the Department of Labor was 
attempting to gain an understanding of the conditions of women in order to inform 
Congress of their findings . The push for protective legislation was not just an idea 
dreamed up by outspoken John Keegan, it was a legislative tool used to right the ills of 
industrialization. Dr. Andrews, a representative of the New York Department of Labor, 
spoke before the commission in Indianapolis and addressed those at the hearing in 
regards to competition. He stated: 
Every time we make a map and put the colors to indicate where different 
states stand in important legislation, almost always our attention is called 
in that way to the position of a fow of the states . .. It shows that if Indiana 
134 Commission on Working Women in Hammond, 16 September 1914, box 14, folder 2, Industrial Board 
Records, ISA, 5. 
135 Ibid. 
136 
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is not going to come up to the standard established by most of the states, 
she must enact more progressive legislation on the subject. [tis not a 
question so much, as we ~~ve ~eard toni~~t, tha.t if this is done, we will be 
put in an unfavorable pos1t1on m compet1t1on with other states. It is not so 
much that question of Indiana. It is a question as to whether we are 
willing to hold back and fall below the standard already adopted in the 
principle industrial states of this country? Really you are hanging back. It 
is not quite playing fair with the other states. 
138 
His statement highlights the crux of the issue about competition; Indiana's disadvantage 
would be no different than any other state with protective legislation, which was 
becoming increasingly common during this time. It was a question of whether they were 
willing to put the women of the state before the men in industry. Employers utilized the 
well-established 19111 century visions of liberty of contract to express their disdain with 
the idea of the State coming in and telling them what to do. The Hammond Chamber of 
Commerce spoke during a hearing in their city, and while they had not performed any 
survey or collected any data, they were under the impression that the conditions of 
working women in Hammond were "good and not in need of legislation." 139 Rodman 
retorted by saying, "a great many people we have talked to on this subject are perfectly 
willing to have everybody in the world regulated except themselves." 140 Regardless of 
facts or the wants of working women, manufacturers overwhelmingly wanted to be left 
alone. A South Bend laundry man put it bluntly, "We don ' t want a bunch of people to 
come in and tell us what to do." 141 Although there has been relatively little contemporary 
analysis of the commission, James Madison, in his book Indiana Way ( 1986), argues that 
138 Ibid., 532-533 . 
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Indiana's failure to enact protective legislation could be traced, in part, to a "continual 
fear of government interference in individual lives." 142 
While it is abundantly clear that the commission had many problems from the 
beginning, one of the largest was the commissioners themselves, and clashes between 
them were fairly common. An Indianapolis News article noted, "The hearings are often 
enlivened by debates between members of the commission, who differ on certain phases 
of the question. Mr. Conway, a union labor advocate, and Mr. Rodman, an extensive 
manufacturer of cotton goods, often put each other on the witness stand, and their debates 
aroused much interest." 143 Their arguments were a matter of ideological dit1erence. 
Instead of allowing those that attended the hearings a chance to speak, commissioners 
disagreed with one another and voiced their opinions on a variety of issues. While they 
were not issuing an opinion on a minimum wage law, Miller, Conway, and Mix had an 
extensive conversation that covered five pages of transcript on the economic effects of 
such a law. 144 Rodman told a labor leader in Lafayette, "legislation cannot create value" 
when discussing a minimum wage. His statement speaks to the belief that the state should 
not be involved with creating what Mix calls "artificial conditions" within the state 
economy. 145 Personal biases on a variety of issues made it difficult for the 
commissioners to sit back quietly and listen to the testimony given to them. 
Rodman proved to be one of the most biased participants of the commission, as is 
evident in his statements about their charge. In the opening remarks of the Lafayette 
commission, he made it clear that he found the commission to be worthless. He said: 
142 James Madison, 77ie Indiana Way, 165. 
143 
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the paramount cause for the creating of the Commission was what we 
would term a little sop handed to the working girls of Indiana during the 
last session of the State legislature, when the bills that they were directly 
and virtually interested in were pigeon-holed or defeated, and as a result of 
this Commission was appointed to relieve the representatives and senators 
from the burden of their responsibility, and as a friend of Rodman will call 
it handed us a buck and made us the goat for investigation.146 
' 
Rodman's statements were offensive on a number of levels. Calling the commission a 
'sop for working girls' demonstrates his belief that they never had any intention of 
creating progressive legislation. However, the irony was not lost on everyone in the 
hearing and it was commented that Rodman must " not expect very much from this 
investigation of Conunissions." 147 To Rodman, the commission's so le purpose was to 
placate the working girls. Furthennore, he argues that the c01mnission took pressure off 
the legislators, as though the failed commission would leave them less politically 
vulnerable. As Representative Keegan's resignation showed, those who truly believed in 
the plight of the working girl would hold themselves responsible for the failure. 
Apart of other various political biases, Chairman Mix 's position as a prominent 
employer greatly influenced his discussions during hearings that led to his failure to enact 
protective legislation. In Hammond, Mix argued against a maximum hour law, utilizing 
statistics to strengthen his point. He argued, " If they [manufacturers] were working on an 
average ot: say, 10 hours and there was a reduction to 8 hours with a corresponding 
reduction of output that, in itself, makes a difference of 20%. In wages, that is more than 
the profit of the average manufacturing institution, which is less than 7% net." 148 In 
South Bend, Mix argued that any legislation that was created would be contrary to 
economic law and would ultimately fail should it go against those rules. His statements 
146 Ibid. , 137. 
147 Ibid ., 148. 
148 Ibid. , 46. 
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were not subtle or unbiased. Surprisingly, newspapers never noted the opinionated 
statements that the commissioners made. 
Although Rodman believed the political backlash could be avoided by the 
appointment of a commission that was nothing more than a commission in name but not 
action, Mix had not always believed that it was a politically savvy idea, as a letter written 
from June of 1913 to Ralston shows. The letter's tone shows the immense deference that 
Mix shows toward Ralston. He disapproves of the appointment of Miller as stenographer 
but states "I have no desire to go against your wishes in the matter." 149 Mix's hesitation 
' 
to the charge of the commission is evident from selections from the following letter that 
was sent to Governor Ralston nearly three months before the commission began. 
I believe that the Democratic part of Indiana cannot afford to take any 
action on an important matter of this kind without having the plan, 
complete and unvarnished truth before it, nor without knowing that there 
is a real and general demand for such legislation from those whose benefit 
of such an act would be passed. 
As the Commission now stands, it seems to me that the tenor of the 
majority report may as well be written without further expense to the 
State ... I certainly am too heavily committed in business affairs to justify a 
strenuous campaign against a crystallized sentiment with the only hope of 
submitting a minority report. 
Mrs. Miller' s influence adds only another clincher to the matter. She 
claims to represent the Women's clubs of the State which is not officially 
disclosed, nor will a canvased membership of this part of the State justify 
it. She was the author of the Eight Hour Bill for women workers-
Senator Grube introduced and championed it in the Senate and Mr. 
Conway is the active head of a labor organization having that as its slogan. 
There can be no doubt about the attitude of the majority of the 
Commission, and it seems that instead of getting an unbiased and accurate 
report of the conditions about the State, the Commission will only serve to 
give further impetus to the Eight Hour Bill, to which they are all 
committed in the next legislature. 
149 Letter from Melvin Mix to Governor Ral ston , 3 June 1913 , Box 118, Folder 2, Governor 's Papers, ISA. 
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Mr. Rodman and myself can make no headway under such restricted 
conditions. We believe we have open minds for the investigation of the 
hours and conditions of women labor and are desirous of working up a 
complete and unbiased report of the facts, which I believe is what you 
want and what is in mind when such as investigation was authorized. 
I am writing rather freely and from a purely personal standpoint- with the 
future of the Democratic party in mind rather than to promote the pressing, 
persistent campaign of a class that will switch to either party in power if 
they can prove a personal advantage thereby, and who do not represent the 
composite thought or needs of the people on their particular subject. 150 
Mix expressed an acknowledgment of his opinions against labor, yet argues there is a 
stronger a bias towards the legislation. Furthermore, he believes that any actions taken 
by the commission should be politically motivated. As has been previously noted , 
elections in Indiana were hotly contested and there was a low margin of victory. The 
Democratic Party had a strong showing in the 1912 elections and Mix points out that this 
legis lative issue should not become a reason for them to become the minority group once 
again . Finally, he addressed the women in question. He views women as a class that was 
not politically worthy of legislation. While women could not vote at this time, Mix 
seemed to have a foreboding that it wou ld happen eventually, and he did not wish to 
legislate in favor of women who could turn against the Democratic Party in the future . 
To him, the move was simply too risky. 
The commission completed its hearings in late September of 1914, and it was not 
until February of 1914 that recommendations were submitted to the legislature. As was to 
be expected, the commissions had a difficult time coming to a consensus and it was 
hypothesized that they would likely submit 3, and perhaps 5 recommendations. 151 
Surprisingly, media coverage for the recommendations was minimal in comparison to the 
150 Ibid . 
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attention given to the failed legislation. 152 Furthermore, there is no record of any 
legislative action that was taken after the recommendations were submitted to the 
legislature. As was to be expected, Mix reported that "the conditions are being improved 
without specific legislation; and while there will always be a short-sighted minority that 
will need spurring up, it is quite apparent that education and competition will do quite as 
much, if not more, to enforce recognition of such economic principles as may be 
accomplished by legislation." 153 Similarly, Rodman recommended, "there is no demand 
either from the employers or the employees for restrictive legislation, and the conditions 
disclosed by our investigation do not disclose any abuses that cannot be corrected by your 
State Inspection Department." 154 Both Mix's and Rodman's recommendations make it 
seem as though there were above average working conditions for the women workers, 
although their commission hearings proved that it was clearly not the case. Like Mix 's 
actions throughout the hearings, his recommendation belittled the needs of women, 
calling them a 'short-sighted minority.' Using the language of the day, women who were 
considered 'mothers of the race ' were anything but a 'short-sighted minority. ' 
Looking back at the early days of the legislative fight, Keegan's resignation, and 
the verbal altercation on the floor of the Senate between Representatives Keegan and 
Korbly, it seemed like the passage of the bill was inevitable. As late as September of 
1914, the future for protective legislation still looked bright and the Indianapolis News 
wrote, employers "apparently take for granted that legislation of this sort will be 
152 I can find just two newspaper articles that address the commission 's recommendations, one from 
February I' ' and one from the 2"d. 
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enacted." 155 Along the way there was a breakdown on a number oflevels, as has been 
addressed in the previous discussion. Legislators were too reluctant, commissioners were 
too biased, working women were too scared, and employers were too pushy. The 
plethora of opinions from legislators, women, employers, and even the commissioners 
made it impossible for the 1915 legislative session to act, or for Ralston to force the 
passage of a bill. 
While Rodman and Mix recommended that competition and education would 
correct any poor conditions, the issue of protective legislation was again brought before 
the Legislature in 1919, though this event is out of the scope of this paper. The 
arguments for hours had not changed since 1913, and women "emphasized the necessity 
of legislation that will prevent the exploitation of women and children and the social 
menace that is to be found in long hours of labor in insanitary factories." 156 The poor 
conditions for women continued, proving that the work of the commission had been for 
naught, nor had the recommendations given by Rodman and Mix. 
Although the bill failed , the hearings were a joke, and the entire issue became a 
political footnote , there is value in examining the failure of this commission. Defeat 
cannot be placed on one person or group, the negligence belongs to the citizens of 
Indiana. Historians have done a disservice to the working women of Indiana by 
forgetting this story. An examination of the commission on working women provides a 
more complete, albeit critical , examination of Progressive Era Indiana. The academic 
works that call the state progressive fail to address the anomaly of protective legislation 
155 
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in Indiana. Party politics and business interests hijacked the commission, leaving it 
hopeless of ever becoming something of value. 
46 
Appendix 
Table l. Average weekly wages and populations compared by the 1 O cities 
visited by the commission 
Fort Wayne $8.67 63 ,933 
Muncie* $7.22 24,005 
Hammond $7.05 20,925 
South Bend $8.77 53,684 
Lafayette $7.50 20,081 
Richmond $7.48 22,324 
New Albany $6.23 20,629 
Evansville $6.80 69,647 
Terre Haute $7.62 58,157 
Indianapolis $8 .01 233 ,650 
Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Hours, Earnings, and Conditions o.llabor o.l 
Women in Indiana Mercantile Establishments and Garment Factories, 1914, Report 160, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1914), 33. " Indiana City/Town Census Counts, 1900 to 2010." STATS 
Indiana. accessed 17 March 2014. 
https ://www .stats.ind iana.edu/popu lation/PopTotals/h istoric _counts_ cities.asp 
*For the survey by the Department of Labor, Muncie was studied as opposed to Peru for 
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